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Introduction
A Contest Success Function (success function for short, hereinafter) is a mathematical tool used in contest theory to determine the winning probabilities of each contender in a contest in terms of individual and aggregate effort/investment exerted. Its intuitive structure and convenient use has given rise to its use in various economic settings that possess an implicit or explicit contest structure. These applications include major fields in economics, business, and political science such as rent-seeking (Nitzan, 1991 and 1994) , military conflicts (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000; Corchón and Beviá, 2010) , marketing (Schmalensee, 1976; Haan and Moraga-González, 2011) , litigation (Robson and Skaperdas, 2008) , and sports (Szymanski, 2003 and Kesenne, 2004) .
Unlike all-pay auctions in which the highest investment/bid wins with certainty (see for example Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996) ), the contests mentioned above have an element of uncertainty. By capturing this uncertainty, success functions provide a theoretical tool to form expectations on the equilibrium outcome of and effort/investment in a contest.
Broadly speaking, success functions had been constructed and have been used to admit only two possible results for a contender, i.e. 'win' or 'lose'. The most prominent of these are the ratio form of Tullock (1980) and the logit form of Hirshleifer (1989) . The game theoretical expectations on aggregate efforts, outcomes, and rents dissipated when one studies success functions that only allow two possibilities are well studied and appreciated in the literature. 1 Recently, there has also been some effort to justify and compare success functions empirically; Hwang (2009) uses military data, Jia (2008) and Peeters (2010) use data from sports with this intention in mind. Experimental justification of the success functions also has been a matter of interest in the literature as exemplified by Millner and Pratt (1989) , and Fonseca (2009) .
Despite this widespread assumption and use, a third possible outcome exists in various contests: a draw. One can instantly enlist sports, military conflicts, rent-seeking, and promotional contests among those. In sports competitions such as soccer 2 , which is also the main interest of this paper, chess, and cricket, a draw possibility is enforced by the design of the game. For military conflicts Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) and Blavatskyy (2010) argue that it is natural to anticipate contenders to end up in the same bargaining position they had before a military conflict. In rent-seeking, the lack of credibility of the authority gives rise to the possibility of a draw as studied by Kahana and Nitzan (1999) . Finally, in promotional contests the recruiting body is entitled by law to deny the employment to all participants if it fails to encounter a fitting candidate.
Draws carry a particular importance in soccer. In a league championship fixture, a draw implies equal (one) point for both clubs and the point allocated in its occurrence makes it strictly better than losing the match which allocates zero points. Moreover, mostly because of the scoring system in and the nature of soccer, a draw is a highly probable outcome of a game; approximately 25%-30% of the matches played in professional soccer leagues end in a draw 3 . These properties of draws in soccer make them an important element to be reckoned with, and many coaches and managers contrive their field strategies accommodating or avoiding a draw depending on the strength of the contender.
There are currently three classes of success functions studied in contest theory that admit a possibility for a draw. The earliest one of those is by Blavatskyy (2010) , who also 4 provides a microeconomic foundation for this success function 4 . This model implies that the probability of a draw gets infinitesimal as aggregate efforts/investments of the contestants grow. Blavatskyy (2010) argues that a draw should seldom be expected when both contenders exert high effort. However, there are contests for which this conjecture may not hold. Sports is an obvious contest environment where differences between teams is canonically thought to be more pertinent in draws. For instance, Peeters and Szymanski (2012) argue that Blavatskyy's success function may not be appropriate for sports.
Especially for soccer, it is intuitive to expect two teams to draw with a relatively high probability when they have similar investment/talent 5 on the field, regardless of the magnitude of the aggregate level of investment/talent. The second class of success functions that admits a possibility of a draw is stochastically axiomatized by Jia (2012) . According to this model, the probability of a draw is a function of the squared difference in efforts and depends on a 'coarseness-parameter' that serves as a threshold against which the difference is checked. The most recent axiomatization and analysis of a success function with draws is by Vesperoni and Yildizparlak (2016) in which the propensity of drawing in a contest is captured by a 'draw-inclination' parameter that determines the degree of the polynomial of effort difference. In this paper, the manner in which a draw is handled axiomatically and game theoretical expectations on aggregate effort and rent dissipation diverge profoundly from those in Blavatskyy (2010) and Jia (2012) . Particularly for soccer, this model forecasts an adverse impact on investment/talent or aggregate squad effort for large draw points in games with heterogeneously resourceful teams. Moreover, it also implies that aggregate 4 This form is stochastically axiomatized by Jia (2012) . 5 We use (aggregate) investment/talent/effort interchangeably throughout this paper. We discuss this choice of use later in the paper.
effort/investment is larger compared to the fixtures where draws are not possible, even when the draws are equivalent to losing in terms of prize/points. The former implication of Vesperoni and Yildizparlak (2016) may be a possible theoretical basis of the universal reduction in points allocated in case of a win from 2 points to 3 points, beginning in 1983 with the English Premiere League. In relative terms, this change reduces the points allocated for a draw.
There is a further issue for Blavatskyy's (2010) success function that may be relevant in empirical matters: this form is not homogenous of degree zero, i.e. the measurement of the efforts such as currency, energy, time etc. matter in determining the probability of an outcome. On the other hand, the success functions of Jia (2012) , and Vesperoni and Yildizparlak (2016) are both homogenous of degree zero.
In this paper we first set out to assess the empirical performance of success functions for draws. 6 For this purpose we manually build a dataset from seven major European soccer Jia (2012) , and Vesperoni and Yildizparlak (2016) . We also include a benchmark random choice model as a robustness check. We estimate the parameters of success functions, which imply a probability function each, by using a general maximumlikelihood procedure, and compare the goodness-of-fit of each success function with the test of Vuong (1989) for non-nested maximum-likelihood models.
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Our results favor the success functions of Jia (2012) and Vesperoni and Yildizparlak (2016) , implying that the success functions that use relative differences in investment/talent as the major determinant for a draw (instead of aggregate investment/talent) are more relevant for soccer. Moreover, all the success functions used fare better than the benchmark model which suggests that the investments matter in the outcome. The results obtained from our maximum-likelihood procedure is also confirmed in the probit estimation for which we regroup the data into a binary variable of outcome as 'draw' and 'no-draw', and use aggregate talent and difference in talent per match as regressors.
Last, we compare some key features of the soccer matches that have major impact on results across European leagues: the return on talent, home-bias and talent inequality. The former two are designated and estimated by the maximum-likelihood procedure as parameters of success functions, and we build a conjecture on the latter from the data and summary statistics. Briefly, we find that European soccer leagues have widely different characteristics in return on talent and home-bias even though they operate on essentially 8 To our knowledge, this method is first used by Peeters (2010) in order to compare the performance of Tullock's (1980) and Hirshleifer's (1989) success functions that allow only a single outcome for a match, i.e. some contestant wins with probability 1.
identical rules. These results were also established before by Pollard G. and Pollard R. (2005) , and by Peeters and Szymanski (2014) more recently. The reasons for this effect are far from clear though; ranging from referee bias (Dohmen, 2008) to facility familiarity (Loughead et. al., 2003) and crowd size (Nevill et. al., 1996) . Departing from the macro perspective taken in the majority of the research in home-bias 9 , i.e. using points earned at home-field in excess of the points earned at away-fields, by using success functions, we take a match-based approach in which home-bias enters in the probability function as a multiplier of the average market value of a team. Thus, our method may crowd out some 'expected' home wins (e.g. matches played between two teams that immensely differ in aggregate talent, and the team with the larger talent holds the home-field advantage) and further refine homebias estimations. We further find that there are major differences in terms of talent inequality between teams in different national leagues which may serve as a clue to explain the significantly different rates of draws among leagues.
Data
In We use the average market value of the line-up for each match as a proxy for the aggregate talent or efforts of the club. The implication contest theory has on sports is that the talent acquired by costly investment, which translates into winning probabilities for clubs, is one of the main determinants of an outcome of a match. Transfermarkt places a monetary value for a player's talent based on individual performance. Thus, in essence, it approximates aggregate talent a club possesses. Even though market values do not reflect a direct cost, they do represent the opportunity cost of a player to the club, i.e. if a player is over-paid (underpaid) relative to his performance, for his current club the player is a high-cost (low-cost) investment. Thus, by foregoing to sell a player, the clubs bear an opportunity cost of transfer payments. Therefore, our interpretation of the market values represents an indirect measure for club investment. On the other hand, as we do not test for Nash equilibrium predictions but the success functions themselves, the actual cost of a squad to the club does not affect our results.
Our choice for proxy may seem confusing firstly, because transfermarkt uses a combination of opinions and data analysis of performance of the individual players as He (2013) reports. Additionally, in similar empirical research on soccer, the major data source is the payroll (wage) data as in Szymanski and Smith (1997) , Hall, Szymanski, and Zimbalist (2002) , and Szymanski (2012 and 2014) . Unfortunately, the payroll data is unavailable for us.
Nevertheless, there are certain advantages we find by using average market values instead. Most importantly, our data offers richer dynamics because transfermarkt regularly (and occasionally irregularly if an important incident takes place in the career of the player)
updates individual player market value based on player performance criteria. The market value of a player is also updated in the beginning of every season based on individual transfer market performance. Therefore, the time periods in which the market value of a player changes are more frequent than the one in the payroll data as the contract terms do not change frequently and are rather long. This feature enables us to observe a faster updating of the winning probabilities of the clubs whenever a squad member's market value changes within a season. The rapid updating is rather important as, generally, the young and talented players in the beginning of their career receive lower wages and while being watched closely and finally transferred by major clubs receive significant increases in their wages later in their career. Therefore, even if their individual input to overall talent of their previous clubs is large, the wage they receive when they are an early career player does not translate this into an augmentation in winning probabilities. The opposite case is even more obvious. If a player's performance decreases due to injury or other idiosyncratic reasons, the wage he receives stays the same until his contract ends or is terminated. Therefore, even if his wage would account for a large impact in the empirical expectation of his club's success, his real contribution would be much smaller or in some cases nil. We can provide recent examples of both cases. For the former, an example is Riyad Mahrez, who was awarded PFA Players'
Player of the Year in the Premier League after a fruitful career in Leicester City (England).
His market value has increased constantly from £1.06 million in January, 2014 to £25.50 failing to make it to the line-up of the team due to injury or coach preference even though he is the highest paid member of the squad, his market value has declined from £12.75 million to £7.65 million in transfermarket. In both cases, if the wage the player earned in a season was used in the analysis, it would be highly likely to have estimated rather biased probabilities of winning, losing, and drawing for both Leicester City and Fenerbahce. This situation may be generalized to almost every professional player at some point in their career.
There are also some secondary advantages of using transfermarkt data. First, the average market values are reported based on the line-up squad of the team for each match.
Thus, we are able to exclude the squad members who are not able to make an appearance due to injury and low performance. Moreover, as the market values are averaged within the lineup, we are able to remove some of the undesired bias related to a large inequality of talent within the squad. This is rather important in developing championships, such as the one in Turkey, in which we can observe large disparities in pay within the team that results in a rather inflated aggregate talent level measured.
Obviously, there are also some disadvantages of using transfermarkt data. A major disadvantage may be its partial dependence on opinion, therefore fan bias. However, first, transfermakt does not evaluate each opinion equally (the members have trust scores based on the post-validity of their opinions in transfer seasons), and data analysis on player performance is a crucial part of market values reported. Moreover, Peeters (2016) finds that transfermarkt data is an unbiased estimator of international soccer matches and reports that there is no evidence of 'wishful thinking' from the crowd.
A concern about endogeneity may also be raised. Because, first, transfermarkt data allows for and updates the strategic measures taken by the manager or the coach for a particular match such as reserving important players, e.g. the ones played once championship is guaranteed before the league ends, the matches played against weaker teams, etc. However, these strategies are generally used by a coach when the championship is guaranteed or when it is obvious that the club would be demoted to a secondary league before the season ends.
Thus, generally, the number of such fixtures are relatively few. Secondly, and more importantly, as the transfermarkt is responsive to in-field performance of individual players, the team probability of winning may be seen as affecting the market values of the players.
However, first, as the individual player performance is the basis for evaluation it does not necessarily correlate with team performance. For instance, a large number of the players in Leicester City experienced a decrease in their market values even though the club performed spectacularly in 2015-2016 season and earned the championship for the first time in the Premier League. Secondly, the transfermarkt data is only updated twice a year ordinarily and once more in the end of the transfer-season. Thus, it only updates player data more frequently than the payroll data but not on a match basis. Last but not the least, as the team performance as a whole is also reflected in the ability of the clubs to be able to afford high talent, it may be argued that the same problem may also exist in the payroll data, which is used as the primary data source in the literature.
The last reason we think transfermarkt data is valid for its purpose here is, as we shall see later, that the estimates of essential parameters such as the one reflecting importance of investment/talent in high club performance (ROT) 13 in a certain league are in line with recent literature such as Peeters and Szymanski (2014) . Thus, even though we are unable to test for correlation of our data with the payroll data, we believe it is appropriate to embark on our analysis using transfermarkt values. He (2013) may also be consulted to see an analysis of the validity of market values reported by transfermarkt.
Estimation Methodology
Now, we start explaining our method of estimation. We use three success functions that admit a possibility of a draw accompanied by a simpler random choice function that we call the naive model. Denoting the probability assigned by the success function to the home team winning when it possesses the average market value and the rival possesses the average market value on match by (•), and the probability attached to the away team winning on the same match by (•), and the vector of average market values in match by = ( , ), these three success functions and the naïve model are presented below.
13 The name 'decisiveness' is coined for this parameter in contest theory as it reflects how decisive efforts are in the result of a contest, e.g. Hirshleifer (1991) .
( ) = + + ;
Expression (1) discerned from the functional forms, in BSF, the probability of a draw is determined by and negatively correlated with the level of aggregate talent/investment. On the other hand, JSF and VYSF use difference in talent/investment levels for attaching the probability of a draw, though in different manners. The former uses a linear weighting of the squared differences while the latter uses a polynomial weighting in differences in investment. In both success functions the difference in talent/investment level is negatively correlated with the probability of a draw.
Denoting the vector of parameters for success function by Φ (Φ = ( , , ), Φ = ( , , ), Φ = ( , , )), the data for the average market values of the two teams as = ( 1 , 2 ) , the data for home and away matches by = (ℎ 1 , ℎ 2 , . . , ℎ , . . , ℎ ) ∈ {1,2} , and the data for the result of each match by = ( 1 , 2 , . . , , . . , ) ∈ {0,1,2} , we define the log-likelihood function as:
In function (5), is the number of observations (matches) for each league (all matches in data for the pooled estimations), = ( 1 , 2 ) is the average market value of the line-up of the teams 1 and 2 for the match in thousand pounds, ℎ ∈ {1,2} shows which team plays in the home field in match , and = 1 ( = 2) designates that team 1 (2) won match , and = 0 shows that the match ended in a draw, (•) is the indicator function that takes the value 0 or 1 depending on whether the values of and ℎ match the indexes ∈ {0,1,2}
and ℎ ∈ {1,2}. The identities of the clubs are irrelevant in the specifications of the success functions above. Thus, it is sufficient to designate which team played as the home (away)
team and which team lost (won) the match. Denoting , ∈ {1,2}, ≠ , as the team labels ( for the home and for the away team), the pointwise likelihood function for match is:
In expression (6) denotes the probability of a draw. The explicit form of the pointwise likelihood function above is given by the particular success function, , used, i.e. by one of equations (1) calculated by a manually written code using MATLAB, which is available on demand.
For robustness check we also employ a probit estimation by regrouping the result of each match. This may sound confounding at first as; first, probit also uses a maximum likelihood technique; and second, the probit allows for a binary outcome set only. For the former, it may be discerned that the success functions define a special probability function whose parameters can only be estimated by defining a particular log-likelihood function for each success function used. This is the reason we were not able to use standard statistical package programs in the estimations of the success functions. However, each success function presents a certain hypothesis about the nature of draws: BSF's implicit hypothesis is that the likelihood of a draw increases as the aggregate talent on the field declines; on the other hand, JSF and VYSF suggest that the likelihood of a draw increases with the level of dissimilarity between two teams in talent on the field. These two hypotheses can be tested with a probit model which assumes a normally distributed binary outcome regressed over two measures that represent the hypotheses suggested by individual success functions and (0,1) distributed errors. For the latter, as the two hypotheses are mutually exclusive statements about the nature of a draw, we simply reconstruct the data by labelling each result as 'draw'
and 'no draw', and estimate the regression coefficients (stated below in explicit form) using maximum-likelihood offered by standard statistical packages.
Using the probit model as explained above, we regress the result of a match ('draw' or 'no draw') on the absolute difference in average market value ( ), aggregate average market value ( ) 15 , and a dummy variable ( ) that takes value 1 if the away team has a larger average market value than the home team, and 0 otherwise. The last variable is intended to crowd out the immense impact of the home-bias. Thus, the estimated pointwise likelihood function is:
where (•) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. This in turn refines the precision of our results by demonstrating whether aggregate talent or the difference in talent (or both) is (are) the main determinant in drawing.
The summary statistics presented below in Table 1 show a decline for the matches that end in a draw in all leagues. Therefore, for a clearer inference, we use the success functions in our empirical analysis as explained above.
Lastly, as we stated in the previous section, success functions equip us with an opportunity to estimate some parameters that influence the result of a soccer match profoundly. We call these parameters the ROT (Return on talent, in equations (1)- (3)), and home-bias ( in equations (1)- (4)). In contest theory, the former measures how sensitive the result is to effort level exerted by the contestants; in sports the equivalent interpretation is how aggregate talent is important in determining the result. Equivalent or identical parameters to ROT were formerly used by Szymanski (2003) , Peeters (2010) , Szymanski (2012 and 2014) in sports economics. The latter is a general parameter in contest theory that measures any contestant-specific exogenous feature that increases or decreases the effort of a certain contestant in a multiplicative way. As the literature on soccer has concluded and our summary statistics in Table 2 point out, home-bias is a very influential parameter on the result of a match (see e.g. Clarke and Norman (1995) , Carmichael and Thomas (2005) , Koyama and Reade (2009) ). Our statistics show that 46% of all the matches end up in home teams winning. For Italy and France, a draw is actually the second most likely outcome for a home team! Moreover, as we show later, our estimated parameters point out that moving from the away field to home field increases the probability of winning from at most 23% to 47% (Italy), to at least from 28% to 43% (Russia) in a match between two equal teams in average market value. Lastly, the measure MVA-HA% (Market Value
Advantage versus Home Advantage) we include in Table 2 shows that the matches that end in a draw are more likely to be the ones where the home team does not hold the market value advantage. This is a clear indication that the home-bias enters in the probability of winning as 
Results and Discussion
The estimation results presented in Tables (5-8) indicate that every parameter estimated for each success function are significant both with and without home-bias. 18 In Table 3 we present an example for the estimation output for pooled data with home-bias.
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[ Table 3 here]
First of all, the likelihood ratio test indicates that the addition of the home-bias, which turns out to be an advantage as expected, significantly improves the fit. 20 More importantly, comparison using Vuong's closeness test in Table 4 shows that JSF and VYSF are almost equally appropriate for each league individually and also as a whole. In particular, the former 17 MVA-HA% is the percentage of matches in which the home team also possesses the larger market value line-up. This measure is intended to address the multiplicative effect of the home-bias on individual club market values in success functions (1)- (3). 18 Only the estimation results (with home-bias) for the Premiere League are presented in the appendix. The remaining results are omitted for brevity and are available on demand.
19 Some data points were excluded in the pooled data due to time inconsistencies in the estimations. 20 As this is evident from the differences in log-likelihood between specifications (see tables (5) - (19)), log-likelihood tests are not reported in text but provided on demand.
performs better for Spain, Germany, Turkey, and Russia while the latter performs better for England, Italy, and France and for the pooled data. However, these differences in performance are not significant as reported in Table 4 .
We also see that JSF and VYSF generally fit data better than BSF. The significance is at the level 0.01 for the pooled data, 0.05 for England, Italy, France, Turkey, and Russia, and at 0.10 for Spain and Germany. This result is in accordance with the argument of Peeters and Szymanski (2012) who discuss the inadequacy of the BSF for sports. Therefore, we may safely conclude that a draw is more sensitive to the difference between the talent levels of the two competing teams rather than the aggregate talent level in a match.
[ Table 4 here]
The results of the probit model estimated, which conforms to our judgement above, is reported in Table 5 . As one may observe, the coefficient of the mean aggregate average market value ( ) is not significant. Moreover, it has conflicting signs across leagues whereas its theoretical expected sign is negative. On the other hand, the coefficient of the difference in average market value between teams ( ) is significant (except for Germany and France) and negative for every championship including the pooled data. Thus, we confirm our expectation that difference between market value decreases the probability of a draw in a given match. We also observe that, if the larger average market value team is playing away, it is generally more likely to observe a draw as the coefficient for is significant (except for France) and positive for all championships and pooled data. This result shows the impact of the home bias partially offsetting the advantage of possessing a larger market value as implied by the success functions and our summary statistics in Table 2 indicate.
[ Table 5 here]
Lastly, all success functions perform better than the NF. Even though the log-likelihood of the NF improves with the addition of the home-bias parameter, the improvement is surpassed by any of the success functions used. This shows the clear importance of average market values (or talent) in the performance of a soccer club.
Next we compare certain characteristics of the leagues with VYSF as it nominally outperforms the other two using pooled data. We further refine the results by using estimates with the home-bias parameter ( ) due to their conclusive superiority.
First of all, the estimated values for draw-inclination parameter, ̂, are in conformity with the particular draw characteristic of the different leagues as we present in Table 6 , i.e.
the leagues with larger draw frequency attain larger values of . It is worth noting that the estimated draw-inclination parameter is surprisingly very similar to the value where the efforts are theoretically maximized, i.e. ≃ 1.44, in Vesperoni and Yildizparlak (2016) .
Even though this effort maximizing value is for the symmetric VYSF, estimated values without the home-bias also confirm this result. There is no clear explanation for this result; nevertheless, the theoretical conjecture is that in a completely fair league the draw-inclination parameter is such that the clubs would exert the largest possible investment.
[ Table 6 here]
We also present the Gini coefficient 21 for each league in Table 6 to see if there is a relation with the frequency of draws and the inequality in mean market value, which is also illustrated in Figures (1) - (7) per league. Note that, as we confirmed that the probability of a draw is determined by and negatively correlated with the difference in average market value levels, a 21 Here, the Gini coefficient designates the level of inequality in average market value across teams sampled in a league. A larger Gini coefficient points out a larger inequality in market values.
The Gini coefficients reported are calculated manually, aggregating all seasons for each league.
league that hosts a large inequality would have a lower frequency of draws. Data shows that the lowest frequency of draws is in Spain (22%), which also has the largest Gini coefficient (0.47), i.e. the maximum talent inequality. However, Russia, for which the Gini coefficient is 0.43 presents the second largest draw frequency (28%). On the other end of the spectrum, the lowest Gini coefficient (0.31) coincides with the highest draw frequency (30%), which is for
France. These results also are concordant with the maximum average market differences observed in overall fixtures, which is also reported in Table 6 . However, generalizing a result from the Gini coefficient is impossible here as it requires data from many other soccer leagues. Thus, we leave this as future research.
Lastly, we discuss the estimated parameters that do not directly influence a draw, i.e.
the ROT ( ) and the home-bias ( ). Their estimated values are reported in Table 7 . We also report the estimated elasticities ( ℎ , ) for each league of playing at home and away, respectively, in Table 7 . Elasticity in our context is the percentage change in the probability of winning in response to a 1% change in investment of a team facing a rival that has the same level of investment. Formally, elasticity is calculated as = ( , )
, at = which adds up to ℎ = 1+ and = 1+ for home and away field elasticities, respectively.
The home and away field elasticities are different as VYSF changes between the two specifications in expression (3).
[ Table 7 here]
Estimated values of the parameter ROT (̂) point out that the aggregate talent/investment affect the outcome the most in the English Premier League and the least in the French Ligue 1. This result is concordant with the recent literature on soccer, e.g. Peeters and Szymanski (2014) , especially for the Premier League. This difference makes a large impact on the elasticities; in the Premier League a 1% increase in average talent of a club increases the probability of winning for the home team by 0.43% (0.63% for an away team) against an identical opponent, while in the French Ligue 1 it only makes a difference of 0.24% (0.64%
for an away team). For away teams an increase in average market value is much more important as it is the only channel to overcome the home advantage of the rival.
On the other hand, we see that the home-bias is a very decisive element in the outcome of a match in general. The most dominant home-bias is estimated in the Italian Serie A which takes the probability of winning from 23% to 47% against an equal opponent if the team switches from away field to home field. Whereas, we observe that the least dominant home-bias is in the Russian Premier Liga which still takes the same probability of winning from 28% to 43%.
Last, we draw a general picture for the leagues in our data using our estimation results and summary statistics. The differences we observe seem to be a result of how ROT, homebias, and inequality in average market values interact with each other for each league. In the Premier League (England) and Bundesliga (Germany) the home-bias and ROT seem to be similar. The former parameter being relatively low (the lowest second for the Premier League and the lowest third for Bundesliga) and the latter parameter high in comparison to other leagues (the highest and the second highest, respectively and ROT (second lowest in all leagues) which seem to be vaguely similar to Spain where inequalities seem to matter the most.
We have so far no evidence why these differences exist as these leagues are organised by similar market conditions and identical rules. This question remains as an issue of future research for the time being. Further, a dynamic use of the success functions in estimations may also demonstrate the long trends in these variables which has been the research issue in Pollard G. and Pollard R. (2005) for home-bias, even though the measure used in calculating the home-bias is rather different to ours in this paper.
Conclusions
Draws are one of the possible outcomes in various contests. In this paper, we have presented an empirical evaluation of the success functions that admit a possibility of a draw using data from the seven most valuable leagues in Europe. Moreover, we have analysed the difference between these major leagues in terms of some important characteristics such as investment inequality, home-bias and return on talent.
Our empirical evaluation has indicated that the two success functions, i.e. the ones by Jia (2012) and Vesperoni and Yildizparlak (2016) , outperform the success function by Blavatskyy (2010) . The main reason for the difference in performance is the contrast between the two groups of functional forms in their allocation of draw probability: for the former group, Jia (2012) and Vesperoni and Yildizparlak (2016) , the difference in effort is the main determinant in the probability of a draw, whereas Blavatskyy (2010) , takes the aggregate effort for its main determinant in probability of a draw. We have also demonstrated the robustness of this result with a probit estimation in which we have found that the probability of a draw decreases significantly with the magnitude of the difference between the market values of the two teams. On the other hand, the aggregate market values do not seem to affect the probability of a draw significantly.
The estimated values obtained for the talent inequality, return on talent, and homebias for each league have shown intriguing differences among individual leagues which may be connected to aggregate talent levels, inequality among teams, or the level of effectiveness in imposing the rules of the game. These results indicate that further research is necessary in this area to understand the reasons for the diverging characteristics of different leagues. Our method also has provided an opportunity to use micro (fixture-based) data in the estimation of home-bias, return on talent, and other important variables that may be of interest in the literature on soccer.
Obviously, our results only support the first two success functions exclusively for sports contests, particularly for soccer. In different contexts such as labour tournaments, rentseeking contests, and military conflicts results might differ from the ones obtained here.
Nevertheless, this paper has shown that the aforementioned classes of success functions are suitable for contest applications where the draw element is conspicuous and relevant. Table 7 . ROT, home-bias, and elasticities across leagues 
Tables

